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Abstract 
Over the last few decades, China has seen a steep rise in diverse eco city and low carbon city 
policies. Recently, attention has begun to focus on the perceived shortcomings in the practical 
delivery of related initiatives, with several publications suggesting a gap between ambitious 
policy goals and the emerging realities of the newly built environment. To probe this further, 
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in this article we examine – based on the policy network approach – how the gap between 
high-level national policies and local practice implementation can be explained in the current 
Chinese context. We develop a four-pronged typology of eco city projects based on 
differential involvement of key (policy) actor groups, followed by a mapping of what are 
salient policy network relations among these actors in each type. Our analysis suggests that, 
within the overall framework of national policy, a core axis in the network relations is that 
between local government and land developers. In some cases, central government agencies – 
often with buy-in from international architecture, engineering and consulting firms – seek to 
influence local government planning through various incentives aimed at rendering 
sustainability a serious consideration. However, this is mostly done in a top-down manner, 
which overemphasizes a rational, technocratic planning mode while underemphasizing 
interrelationships among actors. This makes the emergence of a substantial implementation 
gap in eco city practice an almost predictable outcome. Consequently, we argue that special 
attention be paid in particular to the close interdependency between the interests of local 
government actors and those of land and real estate developers. Factoring in this aspect of the 
policy network is essential if eco city implementation is to gain proper traction on the ground. 
 
Keywords: eco city development; policy implementation; policy network theory; 
typology of eco cities; low carbon cities; China 
 
1. Introduction 
Perhaps more than anywhere else in the world, in China concepts of sustainable urbanization 
have proliferated among policy-makers, professionals and academics (Caprotti, 2014; de Jong 
et al., 2015; Joss and Molella, 2013; Wu, 2012). Yu (2014) and Liu et al. (2014) have 
provided overview analyses of the various initiatives launched by Chinese governmental 
bodies over the last couple of decades. Before 2000, the Chinese government (national and/or 
local) had already adopted programs to promote the ‘green city’, the ‘garden city’ and the 
‘national environmental protection model city’. Post-2000, the ‘eco-city’, the ‘low carbon 
city’ and even the ‘low carbon eco city’ have been added to the list. The number of officially 
recognized demonstration and model cities across these programs has since risen to several 
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hundreds and keeps on growing. The Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP) initiated 
an ‘eco cities’ program; the National Development and Reform Committee (NDRC) one for 
‘low carbon cities’; and the Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development (MOHURD) 
one for ‘low carbon eco cities’. In doing so, they have assumed the role of patrons of 
provinces, cities, districts and counties across the country wishing to become exemplars for 
sustainable urbanization (see Appendix 1). To date, 92 pilot cities, districts and counties have 
been recognized by MEP (MEP, 2013b; MEP 2015); NDRC has ratified six provinces and 36 
cities (NDRC, 2012); while MOHURD has signed up two provinces and two cities, plus a 
further 15 cities through two cooperation programs (one Sino-American, the other 
Sino-European. These numbers exclude a plethora of additional initiatives and projects 
initiated directly by local governments without any official recognition or backing by Beijing. 
Across these national initiatives, much attention has focused on formulating ambitious policy 
goals and establishing sophisticated indicator systems (e.g. MEP, 2007); this can also be seen 
reflected in the academic literature (Dong et al., 2015; Price et al., 2013; Li et al., 2009). 
More recently, however, attention has begun to shift towards perceived shortcomings, if not 
failure, in the delivery of various eco city 1  initiatives. Several analysts point to not 
insignificant hiccups and complications in the actual implementation of these policies; this 
lays bare a significant gap between, on one hand, ambitious policy goals and attractive design 
and development visions and, on the other, the emerging realities of the newly built 
environment (Alusi et al., 2010; Pow and Neo, 2013; Caprotti, 2013, 2014; Hult, 2013, 2015; 
Rapoport, 2014; Joss and Molella, 2013; Chang and Shephard, 2013; de Jong et al., 2013b). 
Similar critique has been raised concerning high-level eco city projects in other parts of Asia, 
such as South Korea (Shwayri, 2013; Yigitcanlar and Lee, 2014), Abu Dhabi (Cugurullo, 
2013; 2015) and India (Joss and Cowley, 2016). And in Europe, too, the challenge of policy 
implementation has become apparent, as for example reported in the case of the English 
eco-town initiative (Tomozeiu and Joss, 2014) and the French national Ecocité program 
(Boxenbaum et al., 2011).  
                                                          
1
 In the context of this research, the term ‘eco city’ encompasses the variety of terminology adopted by 
the various national ministries, including ‘low carbon city’ and ‘low carbon eco city’. See Appendix 1 
for full list of initiatives. 
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Some analysts (e.g. Bluepath City, 2013; Yin, 2014; Zhou et al., 2014; EU-Asia dialogue, 
2014; Yu et al., 2015) interpret the phenomenon of policy implementation gaps essentially as 
start-up problems to be fixed by perfecting eco city indicator systems, attuning and 
integrating the use of the various policy instruments deployed by government organizations, 
and supporting best practice sharing and capacity building. Other analysts take a more critical 
stance, viewing the new wave of eco city projects and their differently named cousins as not 
much more than the promotion of real estate and large engineering business interests while 
casting doubt on the prospects of significantly improving eco-efficiency within existing 
production modes (e.g. Chien, 2013; Caprotti, 2014; Bulkeley et al., 2014; Zheng et al., 2014; 
Rapoport, 2014; Xu, 2015). Both analyst groups agree that the promotion of sustainable cities 
through attractive terminology and their global mainstreaming is at least in part illustrative of 
a wider city branding practice aimed at attracting investors – including foreign ones – and a 
highly educated workforce (Joss et al. 2013; Shwayri, 2013; Yigitcanlar and Lee, 2014; Braun 
et al., 2014; de Jong et al., 2015), although their views may differ as to the sincerity of the 
political intentions underlying these sustainable urbanization initiatives and their potential to 
achieve significant change. 
Pinpointing whether sustainable city projects are successes or failures is not straight forward. 
In some cases, failure is rather obvious, such as when projects are simply not realized, when 
ghost towns emerge and stay empty for extended periods of time, when projects run into 
financial difficulties, or when their (social, economic, environmental) sustainability 
credentials are evidently questionable. However, in other cases, evaluating success or failure 
is trickier; for instance, when development and construction activities take place largely 
according to plan yet some sustainability indicators are not met. In assessing contemporary 
eco city developments in China, some international analysts have highlighted perceived 
implementation gaps between original goals and actual achievements, such as in the case of 
Tianjin Eco-City concerning aspects of social sustainability (public housing), green transport, 
or biodiversity, among others (e.g. Caprotti, 2014). In response, some domestic commentators 
assert that the adoption of eco city initiatives and related indicator frameworks are in 
themselves a major step forward and that developments, such as Tianjin Eco-City, play an 
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important exemplary role in promoting more sustainable urbanization (Bluepath City, 2013). 
While such differences in assessment can only be expected given various analytical and 
professional perspectives, this debate nevertheless highlights the importance of policy 
implementation and related gap analysis. And if even Tianjin Eco-City, the national flagship 
among the growing number of Chinese eco city initiatives, prompts related debate, then 
questions about policy implementation success vs failure can be expected to be centrally 
important across the spectrum of contemporary Chinese eco city initiatives. 
Consequently, in this contribution we seek to examine how the perceived implementation gap 
between high-level national policy initiatives and actual policy and project implementation in 
various Chinese localities can be explained. We approach this question not so much from an 
environmental engineering, urban planning or political geography perspective, as is the case 
with the majority of aforementioned publications; instead, we apply a more explicit 
governance perspective, with particular focus on policy implementation through policy 
networks. Ever since Pressman and Wildavsky (1984) explained why policy ambitions 
formulated in Washington DC were dashed in Oakland, implementation has remained a 
classical topic in public policy. And yet, its significance remains too often neglected in the 
discussion about why policy failure occurs, including in the case of sustainable urban 
development. Frequently, the organizational context in which urban sustainability projects 
take place is ignored; official and unofficial goals pursued by public bodies at various 
governmental levels are overlooked; the motives and interests of banks, developers, 
infrastructure builders, engineering consultants and architects are downplayed; the complexity 
of participation by international actors in local planning – a key feature of many eco city 
initiatives in China and beyond (Joss et al., 2013) – is underestimated; and the resources 
required for policy implementation, and which actors have these at their disposal, are not 
taken into account. In short, interdependencies among actors in policy networks do not get the 
attention they deserve (de Bruijn and ten Heuvelhof, 2008; Klijn and Koppenjan, 2015). 
Disregarding these interdependencies is bound to lead to disappointment, but this should be at 
least partly preventable if the alignment of national policy interests with those of other public 
and private actors is considered properly and upfront. Adopting this governance perspective, 
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then, is intended to provide a useful complementary angle to the wider analysis of 
contemporary Chinese eco city initiatives; one, which seeks to shed light on how the 
perceived implementation gap comes about and what role policy networks play in this 
respect. 
The article is structured as follows: the next section outlines an analytical framework based 
on the policy network approach, explaining how this helps to map the alignment of the 
interests of various actors involved in eco city development. In section 3, we summarize 
Chinese national policies for eco cities, low carbon cities and low carbon eco cities, and 
discuss to which extent they address the question of policy implementation2. Section 4 then 
presents four categories of Chinese eco city projects based on the degree to which national 
governmental recognition and international knowledge transfer come into play alongside local 
governance mechanisms. In Section 5, we apply our analytical framework to this eco city 
typology; this allows us to question the usefulness of dominant top-down policy approaches 
(apart from a few national flagship projects), and it provides for a better understanding of how 
actors’ interest alignments shape policy implementation (gaps). The concluding section 6 
offers some suggestions as to how the policy network approach can inform eco city 
development in China (and beyond) – namely, by shifting attention away from the prevailing 
technocratic policy perspective to one which better recognizes the importance of policy 
networks and related resource structures for successful policy implementation. 
2. Policy networks and alignment of actor interests: an analytical framework 
The policy network approach is a family of theories, rather than one singly theory; its various 
strands have in common that they consider policy-making as a process in which multiple 
players jointly make decisions and depend on each other for their implementation (Hill, 
2013). This mutual dependency arises from the fact that no single actor unilaterally has 
sufficient legal, financial, organizational and knowledge resources to push through and 
                                                          
2
 The three programs analyzed here do not constitute the full range of national programs for 
sustainable urbanization, but they are the most comprehensive ones. Other programs, such as those for 
eco industrial parks, sponge cities, eco-civilization demonstration cities and smart cities are either more 
specialized in scope, and thus less suitable for a broader analysis of policy implementation, or more 
recent and thus lacking in sufficient analytical data. 
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execute decisions. Empirical description in these theories often emphasizes the multitude and 
diversity of policy actors, partially conflicting goals and complementarities of power 
resources. Prescription tends towards the acknowledgement that this interdependency should 
be considered upfront and accommodated through the design of interactive decision processes 
(Mayntz and Scharpf, 1975; Kickert et al., 1997; Scharpf, 1997; Koppenjan and Klijn, 2004; 
Sørensen and Torfing, 2009). Recently, attempts have also been made to apply this approach 
to the Chinese context (Zheng et al., 2010; Groenleer et al., 2012). In this article, we mobilize 
basic conceptual terms, such as ‘policy actors’ , ‘goals’ and ‘resources’ (also known as 
‘policy instruments’ or ‘tools of government’), ‘interdependency’, ‘networks’ and 
‘institutions’; while the more sophisticated notions of ‘network management’, ‘network 
constitution’, ‘perceptions’, ‘deadlocks’, ‘decision-making rounds’ and ‘policy windows’ are 
intentionally left out, since these can only be studied in detailed case studies. 
A policy network analysis applied to the implementation of a given national policy program 
can proceed as follows: 
1. Identifying the relevant policy actors involved in the implementation of the policy in 
question. These include governmental agencies at various governance levels; but they 
also entail public enterprises, non-governmental organizations and private 
entrepreneurs and – importantly in the context of (Chinese) eco city initiatives – 
international actors. The resulting network structure can then be compared with how 
the national program recognizes various actors and attributes related roles. A possible 
mismatch (between envisaged and actual network constellation) may well lead to 
implementation failure. 
2. Establishing what are the formal and informal goals of the various policy actors. The 
formal ones normally refer to what is envisaged in terms of policy substance 
(immaterial goals), and the informal ones refer to their material stakes (increase in 
influence and budget). This can be used to analyze to which extent these goals are 
aligned with those of the national ministries; and in case where there is no or limited 
alignment, how this is considered and/or compensated for. Here, too, a possible 
mismatch suggests the likelihood of implementation failure. 
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3. Examining which resources (policy instruments/tools) actors have at their disposal to 
realize their goals. The most classical division is that of ‘nodality’ 
(knowledge/information), ‘authority’ (legal power), ‘treasure’ (funds), and 
‘organization’ (Hood 1986; Hood and Margetts, 2007). This can be used to check to 
what extent and how the need for these resources (to enable national policy 
implementation) is recognized, considered and/or compensated for. This, too, can be 
considered a good indicator for identifying policy implementation gaps. 
4. Analyzing how the actors depend on one another for the matching of their respective 
goals and resources, thus creating an ‘interdependency map’; and examining how 
they deploy interactive strategies and practices to reach workable exchanges and 
compromises. This is used to check to what extent and how the national policies 
acknowledge, or even accommodate, the interactions that make such exchanges 
possible. Again, a mismatch is an indicator of potential implementation failure. 
In the present analysis, we do not focus on the implementation process of individual eco city 
projects as such, but on how national eco city policy programs affect the policy network 
structures of eco city projects. (Where individual eco city initiatives are highlighted in the 
text, they can be found listed in Appendix 1 against the corresponding national programs.) 
Consequently, while the same basic concepts are used as the ones typically deployed to chart 
a policy network relating to an individual case study, here they are applied more broadly to 
policy network structures resulting from national eco city policy programs. Four different 
types of network structures for eco city projects with different actor positions will be 
identified; each has differential effects on how national eco city ambitions manifest 
themselves locally. This typology provides the opportunity to investigate the goals and 
resources of the various actors within each type of network structure; and to consider to which 
extent actors’ attitudes and behaviors align with what is envisioned in the national policy 
programs – that is, how the national ministries foresee the role of other (international, 
national, and local) policy actors within the network structures and view the related 
implementation process. The typology, then, also prompts us to ask whether various ‘local’ 
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adopters of national policy might be guided by other, competing policy interests, with the 
effect of diverting their actions away from the national plans. 
While an analysis of policy implementation at systemic level – rather than with focus only on 
single case studies – is certainly called for, there are nevertheless some methodological 
challenges involved. For one thing, given the large number of eco city initiatives of one kind 
or another across China, it is difficult to extract and distil common implementation trends and 
characteristics from the peculiarities of individual geographic, economic and administrative 
contexts, unless a large comparative study of multiple cases is undertaken. And for another, it 
may turn out to be hard to access relevant data, not least in a context where policy 
implementation is not as yet widely recognized and articulated as a feature of eco city 
development and where the possibility of implementation gaps or failures is rarely 
acknowledged. What is more, access to information and data is often severely restricted for 
those without ‘guanxi’ (personal networks). In response, the present research is based on the 
following three sources: (1) an analysis of key official policy documents and assessment 
reports relating to the three ministries’ eco city programs, in terms of the extent to which 
implementation is a recognized feature (see four indicators above); (2) a review of recent 
academic publications which present analyses of specific Chinese sustainable city projects 
and discuss the contexts and reasons for observed implementational success and/or failure; 
and (3) three expert roundtables with leading academics, policy experts and practitioners to 
elaborate, focus group style, the topic of policy implementation. The workshops took place at 
the Institute for Building Research in Shenzhen (July 2013), Fudan University in Shanghai 
(June 2014) and Tsinghua Tongheng Urban Planning and Design Institute in Beijing (April 
2015)3. Together, this complementary approach should provide a robust basis on which to 
open up and begin to analyze the phenomenon of policy implementation in relation to eco city 
development in China. 
3. Approaches to policy implementation in three national sustainable city 
                                                          
3
 These workshops were coordinated by the Tomorrow’s City Today international research network led 
by Simon Joss (3rdauthor) and organized and facilitated by Martin de Jong (1st author). (See 
acknowledgements for further details.) 
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programs 
This section summarizes the three main Chinese national programs for eco cities, and 
discusses how they address the issue of policy implementation. As national policies, these 
programs have an obviously important framing function (although as noted not all eco city 
projects fall under their direct guidance). In doing so, they point to the policy implementation 
challenge facing contemporary eco city initiatives in China, especially relating to the 
preponderance of a rather technocratic understanding of the policy process and, relatedly, a 
lack of proper recognition of actors other than local government and their respective attitudes 
and behaviors towards (sustainable) urban development. 
The three central ministries dealing with, respectively, environmental protection (MEP), 
housing and urban-rural development (MOHURD), and overarching national development 
(NDRC), have each initiated dedicated programs for sustainable city development (see Table 
1). While each program exhibits specific characteristics, they share one important feature: the 
responsible ministries promote a practice, whereby local governments are prompted to submit 
plans from which the ministries select those that fulfill the policy brief; the chosen initiatives 
are thus elevated to nationally endorsed demonstration projects. 
[Table 1 here] 
MEP’s eco cities, eco districts and eco counties 
The eco city program initiated by the Ministry of Environmental Protection was the first such 
program that integrated a tailor-made indicator system to define and assess performance (first 
issued in 2003; revised in 2007). The indicators for eco cities, eco districts and eco counties 
are divided up into three categories: economic development, environmental protection, and 
social development (MEP, 2007). Among the economic indicators are ones relating to energy 
intensity, and ratio of tertiary industry to GDP. Environmental indicators cover a broad range 
of measures, such as ecological conservation, forest coverage and the quality of water and air. 
Also included are the environmental performance of industrial activities (proportion of 
companies requiring mandatory cleaner production) and levels of urbanization. In 2005, MEP 
specified how the indicators were to be used, weighted and calculated; and it confirmed that 
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its appraisal method was to be applied by local governments themselves, as a means of 
assessing and tracking the performance of the endorsed initiatives (MEP, 2005). In 2006, the 
ministry issued further administrative guidelines concerning the evaluation of the national eco 
cities, districts and counties – that is, those projects singled out for special status as official 
nationwide demonstration projects – and declared their implementation mandatory. Local 
governments seeking to become model cities with demonstration project status were required 
to submit detailed proposals. The winners have since been required to submit annual 
monitoring reports to their respective provincial Environmental Protection Bureaus (EPB). 
Every three years, MEP reviews the progress of the designated eco cities, districts and 
counties. By 2015, 92 cities, districts and counties had been recognized under the scheme 
(MEP, 2013a; MEP, 2015).  
NDRC’s low carbon provinces and cities 
The low carbon city program is managed by the National Development and Reform 
Committee. Its main aim is to reduce the emission of greenhouse gases (GHGs). In 2010, 
NDRC issued a note on the first phase of pilot low carbon provinces and cities (NDRC, 2010). 
This focused on the promotion of low carbon technologies and industries and explicated what 
policy interventions are deemed conducive to reaching this goal. NDRC encourages local 
governments to realize institutional innovation and employ incentives for reducing GHG 
emissions based on established market mechanisms. Local governments, bidding for status of 
‘national demonstrator project’, are expected to show how they plan to deploy low carbon 
technologies to transform their industrial structure and promote low carbon buildings, 
transportation and renewable energy. Upon the initial launch in 2010, five provinces and eight 
cities were selected. However, the performance of this first batch of demonstrator projects 
was evaluated as ‘not very significant’ (NDRC, 2012). This evaluation suggests that these 
proposals had been prepared in a hurry, failing to take into account local specificities and 
conditions. Furthermore, due to the over-emphasis on economic growth in some pilot areas, 
the implementation of low carbon measures was neglected relative to what was promised in 
the original plans. Finally, the absence of any substantial financial support for the selected 
low carbon provinces and cities hampered the effectiveness of the new policy; as a 
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consequence, most governments of demonstration areas – especially those in less developed 
regions – were unable to initiate relevant projects. In 2012, NDRC extended the number of 
demonstrator projects, now comprising a total of six provinces and 36 pilot cities. According 
to its own evaluation, this second batch of proposals was significantly better prepared (NDRC, 
2012). Furthermore, there has been a better geographic distribution leading to greater regional 
variety and allowing for the exploration of different approaches to control GHG emissions. 
Concerning the question of standardization for low carbon cities, according to Mu (2012) the 
set of indicators published by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) in 2010 is 
considered the most comprehensive one. It uses a classification of twelve indicators divided 
up in four groups: low carbon productivity; consumption; resources; and policies. According 
to this framework, a city can be considered low carbon on a given indicator if its carbon 
productivity is 20 percent lower relative to the national average. However, neither this nor 
any other set of standards has to date been officially recognized. This renders problematic 
performance evaluation, benchmarking, as well as the granting of demonstrator project status.  
MOHURD’s low carbon eco cities 
On its part, the Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development initiated its ‘low carbon 
eco city’ program in 2009 (Yu, 2014). The following year, MOHURD signed a framework 
agreement for cooperation with the cities of Shenzhen and Wuxi, as well as the provinces of 
Hebei and Guangdong, to jointly explore what incentives could be introduced to promote low 
carbon policies, green transport, green buildings and the circular economy. In 2011, 
MOHURD established a lead group charged with implementing the low carbon eco city 
program. It stipulated that only new cities or urban districts were eligible for applying to the 
program (MOHURD, 2011b). These cities or districts should be at least 3 km2 in size and 
include minimal agricultural land; the new low carbon eco area should be no further than 30 
km away from the adjacent new town development; and no further than 100 km away from 
the next larger city providing infrastructure. Furthermore, a special feature of the MOHURD 
program is the promotion of international cooperation: in 2013, six cities were included in the 
first round of Sino-American low carbon eco pilot cities in conjunction with the US 
Department of Energy; and in 2015, ten Sino-European low carbon eco pilot cities were 
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selected as part of a cooperation agreement with the European Commission. Both these 
agreements include co-funding measures, joint protocols, technology and knowledge 
exchange, and shared training and capacity development. 
Policy implementation modes 
How do the three (MEP/MOHURD/NDRC) eco city programs view policy implementation? 
In substantive terms, NDRC’s program is the most narrowly defined among the three, with 
singular focus on GHG emissions; in contrast, MEP’s policy is the broadest, encompassing a 
wide spectrum of sustainability issues, while MOHURD’s initiative occupies thematic middle 
ground. What is arguably a more significant difference in their approach to policy steering is 
the use of eco-city indicator systems: MEP and NDRC impose their own indicators on local 
governments; they thus practically hand down the responsibility for evaluating pilot projects 
to local authorities, albeit against nationally set indicator criteria. MEP’s indicator system and 
procedures have evolved into uniform standards, whereas NDRC has not fully standardized 
its approach to date. In the both cases, progress with, and the success of, policy 
implementation are mainly determined based on what local governments report themselves, 
resulting in varying local reporting practice. On its part, MOHURD does not deploy common 
indicators and standards, as a consequence of which policy implementation is even more 
devolved to, and reliant on the self-direction of, local governments. 
Rather than providing complementarities between themselves and therefore a coherent overall 
national policy approach, the three ministries’ programs appear to (be designed to) compete 
with one another. What is more, policy coherence is also undermined by the developmental 
status of the concepts and methods underpinning the policy programs (Li and Liu, 2011). 
Thus, in spite of the semblance of elaborate indicator systems (in the case of MEP and 
NDRC), practitioners often report that they still miss clear measureable targets or manuals 
which they can follow, or a standardized approach stipulating how local governments can 
implement eco city projects (Liu et al., 2014). The implication of this is that while 
quantification abound, assessment of implementational progress remains problematical: 
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strictu sensu implementation success or failure can at present not be established in any 
reliable and transparent manner. 
In other respects, the governance approach in the three programs is remarkably similar. The 
existence and relevance of local governments is recognized: they are seen as loyal drafters of 
plans and reports working towards eco-civilization progress, rather than pursuing their own 
potentially conflicting goals as independent actors. Should they not measure or report their 
information adequately if at all, the national ministries have limited legal, financial, or 
organizational remedies at their disposal: local governments’ compliant participation is 
assumed as a matter of course. And while the relevance of local governments for 
implementation is recognized – albeit as loyal adopters of national policy – that of other 
actors in urban development, such as developers, banks, consultants and residents, is barely 
addressed (Notably, foreign governments and high-tech companies enjoy a comparatively 
privileged position in policy implementation, as illustrated by MOHURD) . Since these other 
actors hardly appear on the radar as co-implementers, their having at their disposal additional 
resources necessary for policy implementation is a non-issue in all three national programs.  
In summary, while the particular details in the governance approach for policy 
implementation may not be exactly the same for MEP’s eco cities, NDRC’s low carbon cities, 
and MOHURD’s low carbon eco cities, in one crucial aspect at least they appear alike: they 
emphasize the role of local governments as executioners of national policy. Local authorities 
(and their international partners) are assumed to be diligent, cooperative and subservient to 
nationally defined eco city goals. Other policy actors do not appear to be recognized in any 
significant ways, nor do their goals and resources. Finally, the use of elaborate technical 
information systems is promoted through these policies (especially MEP and NDRC), as a 
main means of monitoring and evaluating progress towards implementation.  
4. Policy implementation practices across eco city types 
It should come as little surprise that the practical reality of eco city development is more 
complex than that envisaged by the aforementioned national programs. The effectiveness of 
policy implementation hinges on further key factors, including the interests and motives of 
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local authorities which are supposed to enact national policy, as well as other actors drawn 
into the policy networks, notably investors and developers. Therefore, the wider policy 
network and interest constellations need to be considered, too. To this end, the following 
discusses four types of eco city projects in China, which vary in terms of the degree of official 
government endorsement and in terms of international financial and technology input. 
According to Miao and Lang (2014) in their comparative analysis of Tianjin Eco-City and 
Dongtan eco city, our own previous analysis on the robustness of Sino-foreign organizational 
collaboration for eco city development (de Jong et al. 2013b), and the deliberation during the 
three expert round tables as part of this research, national government endorsement and 
knowledge transfer from abroad are seen as crucial inducements to high-quality and 
high-status eco city projects (also see de Jong, 2013; Hult 2013; Wu, 2015). Moreover, these 
two factors also tend to reinforce each other’s impact, which is why they were adopted as 
components for our typology. 
Type 1: Strong national government support, paired with structured foreign involvement. 
A small number of eco city projects, typically ones with high profile and benefitting from 
strong structural international involvement, have been endorsed by the national government to 
be key projects where success is assumed almost a given. This implies not just acceptance as 
one of the many selected demonstrator projects, but also the allocation of significant central 
funding and support through a dedicated governance structure under close supervision by the 
Chinese government, and backed by bilateral support from a foreign government. Projects of 
this type can hardly be allowed to fail and so normally progress to implementation and 
become permanently established. Sufficient investors are attracted, important public facilities 
such as schools and hospitals are established, residential areas tend to become sold out over 
time and the bill of accounts can be shown to satisfy relevant economic actors. The 
Sino-Singaporean Tianjin Eco City is arguably the best known and most high profile 
exemplar. The Sino-Singaporean Suzhou Eco-Industrial Park, Sino-Singaporean Guangzhou 
Knowledge City and Sino-German Qingdao Eco City also fall into this category, although 
conceptually they are on the fringe of what is termed ‘eco city’ in this article.  
M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
 
AC
CE
PT
ED
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
These and similar initiatives are national status projects enjoying the commitment of top-level 
politicians from both national sides, co-funding from state-owned enterprises, investment 
companies and developers, and the sharing of know-how and expertise. As a consequence, 
public officials put in charge of project implementation tend to stay in their positions for 
extensive periods of time, performance monitoring concerning various eco city indicators is 
taken seriously. And the initial project scope may be extended to signal project success, since 
project size and success are seen as closely related in the Chinese context. Hence, for example 
the Sino-German Qingdao Eco City has been upgraded to province-level project (Shandong) 
and its area size increased from 10 to 17km2. By comparison, for the Sino-Singaporean 
Tianjin Eco City an upgrade from currently 31km2 to 143km2 is considered, reflecting its 
high-profile national status. 
Calling these projects the most successful does not imply that all about them is fine: on one 
hand, in terms of social and economic indicators, their project implementation may satisfy 
most expectations and requirements, and funding challenges are forestalled. On the other, 
however, environmental and planning commentators, especially Western ones, often find the 
ecological ambitions disappointing, raising critical questions about the dominance of 
motorways and the dearth of high-quality public transport facilities in these green-looking 
suburban neighborhoods situated dozens of kilometers away from central urban districts. 
Most Chinese analysts, however, emphasize the high livability of these new town areas, the 
key importance of providing public services (especially good healthcare and education 
facilities) to attract middle class residents, and the need for luring green tech companies to 
these areas to effect the upgrading of the industrial base. Furthermore, they argue for patience 
in moving towards the improvement of the ecological situation in the country. 
Type 2: Limited national government support, paired with occasional foreign involvement  
Whether International (formerly Sino-Swedish) Wuxi Eco-City and International (formerly 
Sino-Dutch) Shenzhen Low Carbon City will ever join the ranks of the type 1 remains to be 
seen; meanwhile they fall into type 2. Key to this category of Chinese eco city projects is that 
they are undertaken by financially relatively strong local governments, manage to attract the 
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attention of international engineers, consultants and architects and incorporate their expertise 
in their plans and designs. However, such international involvement does not enjoy bilateral 
governmental endorsement, as in type 1: (prime) ministers may pay a visit or two, perhaps as 
part of a trade mission, or vice premiers may send letters of support, but essentially type 2 
projects are not governed by formal inter-ministerial arrangements. Consequently, foreign 
financial investments often remain limited, with government instead awarding contracts to 
domestic developers. Hence, these projects do not evolve into flagship national (or provincial) 
projects. This makes them significantly more susceptible to political and financial volatility, 
since national (or provincial) governments will not go to any particular length to render them 
successful: the projects essentially remain a local responsibility dependent on local resources.  
As a result, some high profile eco city projects within this category with strong international 
involvement, such as Dongtan eco city, have officially been put on hold even before 
construction could commence. Such relative failure may occur for several reasons, including 
overly ambitious plans, policy and legal conflicts due for example to claiming agricultural 
land for urban development where this is not permitted, and forced resignations of politicians 
who have a central role in the projects (Wu, 2012; Chang and Shephard, 2013; de Jong et al., 
2013b; Miao and Lang, 2014). Other reasons for failure may occur when construction is 
initiated but subsequently slows down or comes to a halt due to, for example, the bankruptcy 
of the developer(s), the departure of the involved foreign engineering and consultancy 
partners, the difficulties to integrate planning and coordinate management due to splicing up 
of plots of lands among multiple developers. Some of these reasons have been in evidence in 
the case of Tangshan-Caofeidian International (formerly Sino-Swedish) Eco-City (Joss and 
Molella, 2013). Yet another variant of type 2 is one where high levels of ambition exist, but 
where eventually the ‘eco’ vision and principles promoted by Western consultants are deemed 
overly utopian and economically unviable by local governments and Chinese developers, 
leading to permanent stalemate between the two sides. Of this subtype, Beijing-Mentougou is 
a characteristic case (de Jong et al., 2013b; VPRO, 2014). 
However, not all examples of project type 2 in China fare badly: International (formerly 
Sino-Swedish) Wuxi Eco City and International (former Sino-Dutch) Shenzhen Low Carbon 
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City are currently under development and so far appear to be reasonably successful in terms 
of visible project management progress and delivering several tangible results. In both cases, 
local government is economically privileged and thus able to pledge considerable investments, 
while also making efforts to ensure quality control. International expertise and knowledge 
transfer have lifted the prestige of these projects, but also laid bare some significant 
misunderstandings between Chinese demand and foreign supply: European partners would 
hope for more effective influence on the actual outcomes of the planning process; and they 
would find it difficult to make a business case for their involvement, since generating 
revenues is often restricted to selling technological equipment while excluding earnings from 
consultancy. At the same time, the eco city concepts being promoted by these foreign partners 
are sometimes stylized and tactically repackaged versions of their homegrown (European) 
experience and practices, and as such ill-suited to the Chinese context. A case in point is 
‘SymbioCity’, which the Swedish players promoted as core concept for both the Tangshan 
and Wuxi eco city projects.  
In spite of type 2’s significantly higher vulnerability to project failure, we should add here 
that even the supposedly ‘unsuccessful’ examples may be only temporarily stalled: local 
governments, developers, and prestigious international architects and engineers may have 
pulled out of Shanghai-Dongtan, Tangshan-Caofeidian and Beijing-Mentougou for the time 
being, but this does not necessarily imply a complete dead end. Potentially lucrative plots of 
available land remain open to future urban development and promising ideas developed by 
world-renowned architects and engineers can be resurrected and revamped. It is probable that 
for most of these projects, new efforts will eventually be made by different parties to 
re-launch the same projects, albeit often under a different label and with revised ambitions. 
Type 3: Nominal support from national government 
The third category relates to provinces, cities and counties that have managed to obtain the 
status of national eco city/low carbon city/low carbon eco city, but were subsequently unable 
to translate this into prestigious projects backed by international advisers and systematic 
reviews by committees to monitor the quality of work. In most cases, these are not the 
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wealthier first-tier cities, but second, third or even fourth tier ones that do not have the 
resources to make substantial investments in costly environmental solutions. Their main goal 
is to enhance the visibility and reputation of their locality to investors, industry and future 
residents; and they try to achieve this by mobilizing an attractive brand name (‘eco city’). 
This is not to say that the efforts to create new sustainable localities are necessarily insincere, 
but it normally does imply that: cities have fewer financial resources at their disposal; that 
concerted monitoring of (quality) performance is weak if not entirely absent; that insufficient 
know-how and expertise is available to boost eco-innovation; and, not least, that dependency 
on developers for generating public revenues through land-leasing is a primary driver of 
related eco city projects. Examples of type 3 sustainable city initiatives abound (see Appendix 
1), but they tend to be less conspicuous and thus relatively understudied compared with types 
1 and 2. Although their environmental performance is hardly ever impressive (see 
Introduction), their social and economic success rates vary. Some are barely distinct from 
regular urban construction projects and, as such, look alike. Others may evolve into 
something more notorious: ghost towns. While the latter are generally viewed negatively, 
some commentators have cautioned against considering failure too soon, as it may take some 
time for new urban developments to become inhabited with residents and businesses. Thus, 
ghost towns may not be the end, but the beginning, of urban development (Shepard, 2015). 
Nevertheless, more often than not these urban projects turn out to be rather faceless new 
towns with limited identity and social and cultural appeal (Li and Liu, 2011; Hulshof and 
Roggeveen, 2011). They end up not offering the attractive cosmopolitan feel originally 
promised, but become mediocre towns for up-rooted workers migrating into new urban 
centers from further afield (Hsing, 2010). 
Type 4: Local initiatives without national government support 
Many localities have developed sustainable urban development initiatives, but have not 
obtained any support, or strived for recognition, from national or provincial government. 
Their features do not differ much from type 3 projects, except that they have no official status 
anywhere beyond their own city or town, and that project progress is not systematically 
reported and monitored. They are, therefore, an even more complicated category to capture 
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than type 3, with little empirical research to go by. A small number of type 4 projects have 
attracted media attention in recent years, such as Huangbaiyu eco village and 
Kunming-Chenggong eco city. Collecting evidence can prove difficult, since information is 
typically removed from websites and official documents following apparent project failure. In 
the case of Kunming-Chenggong, it initially appeared as if it is evolving into a ghost-town, 
although more recently policy ambitions have been scaled down and housing sales have gone 
up (Miller, 2012). As to Huangbaiyu, it has become common knowledge that the designers 
and developers failed to address the wishes and needs of their future inhabitants (May, 2008; 
Ren, 2013; Chien, 2013). Initiated in 2005 by Huangbaiyu village, the project was designed 
by US architects, aiming to realize William McDonough’s renowned ‘cradle to cradle’ 
concept. However, it failed due to the fact that housing and social amenities were both 
inconveniently located and inappropriate for local life styles. Since it was promoted as a 
technical project rather than embedded in established urban planning, and since it lacked 
support from higher government levels, the monitoring of quality and financial feasibility 
were compromised, too. 
5. Implementation of eco city programs as interaction in policy networks 
Given the central role of national programs in eco city development, it is tempting to see the 
national ministries as the dominant actors in sustainable urban development in China. They 
can assume if not claim hierarchical control over local governments by demanding the active 
application of and engagement with, their policy protocols and related indicator systems and 
procedural rules. However, such a narrative of policy centricity risks being overly simplistic 
and negligent of the complexity of the policy processes at work in Chinese eco city 
development. For a start, various national ministries compete with one another in their 
attempts to attract local government initiatives; and their different indicator systems have 
carved up the analytical scenery for eco city reporting into fragmented central-local silo 
systems. Furthermore, although at first sight it appears as if national ministries are in a strong 
steering position because they can select a few promising demonstrator cities from among 
many applicants and insist that local governments should apply their indicators as they 
stipulate, in reality those national ministries also need to prove that their programs are 
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successful. Hence, they depend on strong and reliable applicants able to develop eco cities 
that can be sold as ‘world standard’ demonstrator projects. The tendency of quite a few 
demonstrator initiatives to claim to develop and enforce standards without, however, properly 
doing so, coupled with the risk that data are manipulated (‘gaming the system’) in progress 
reports with little consequence, must be a serious concern for national ministries. 
The question arises as to why many local governments seem reluctant to fully subscribe to 
eco city policies, and especially aspects relating to environmental sustainability, and why in 
practice they tend to perform below expectation. The question then also arises why the 
national government seems limited in its ability to redress this situation of relative 
implementation failure. The answer appears to lie in the tendency that eco city development is 
intricately caught up in the mechanisms governing real estate development: local 
governments promote urban development projects because these boost both local GDP 
growth and increase revenues from leasing out land to developers (Zheng, 2014). Doing so is 
seen not only as benefitting the careers of top officials, but is also imperative for generating 
much needed income: no less than half of local government revenues stem from land-leasing 
(Tao et al., 2010; Chien, 2013; Bai et al., 2014). Developers engage in building real estate 
with the help of soft loans from publicly owned banks responding to the trend of rapid 
urbanization in the country. Both residents and corporations are expected to respond with 
substantial in-migration to these new areas, although over fifteen percent of the housing stock 
in China is unoccupied according to some estimates (Wall Street Journal, 2014, based on 
Southwestern University of Finance and Economics). 
It is within these broader institutional and networking contexts that the implementation of 
national eco city policy programs should be considered and analyzed. From the policy 
network perspective, the local context in which the ministerial policies are adopted – 
including its involved actors, their goals, resources and interdependencies – can now be 
considered in an integrated manner. This is done below in opposite order – from eco city type 
4 to type 1 – reflecting the growing complexity of the network structure at work. 
Type 4: Local initiatives without national government support 
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The simplest form of a policy network is seen in type 4 projects. A network here will 
typically consist of a city government taking the lead in attempting to develop into an eco city, 
and thus being the central player. Its formal goal is to create an attractive ‘green’ new town 
surrounded by an ecologically improved urban environment dominated by high-tech, 
low-carbon industries. Its informal goal is likely to be to earn substantial income from leasing 
out land to developers. Its main resources are arable land, over which it has legal 
competencies to decide whether it be opened up for urban development. Several other actors 
can become associated with such local government efforts to encourage eco city development 
including: national and provincial governments, which have higher-level jurisdiction over 
what may be turned into urban development and under what conditions; district governments, 
which come under the local government’s authority and are responsible for managing the 
actual construction process; developers, which often team up with construction companies, 
engineering consultants and architects; and, not least, banks. City-level governments have 
primarily political and legal resources though limited financial ones, whereas the ‘lower’ 
district authorities have mainly implementation power and knowledge of the situation on the 
ground. The latter proves useful to city governments, but what they depend on more 
importantly are essential financial resources from developers. 
It is not an exaggeration to state that the dependency on revenues from developers centrally 
defines what local governments are receptive to. Thus, it should come as little surprise that 
city governments in this category rather turn to developers than national ministries for 
realizing their initiatives and projects. Likewise, developers depend on the land issued by 
local government, alongside a dependency on banks to provide attractive loans and, of course, 
reliance on future residents and companies to create demand for real estate. In such a setting, 
it is highly unlikely that central government policy programs will fundamentally alter the 
orientation that local governments have in relation to the private sector. Environmentally 
friendly solutions are only likely to emerge if developers value them; and since environmental 
sustainability represents mostly a cost to developers, it is unlikely to become a voluntary 
priority. In short, type 4 projects find themselves in a comparatively disadvantageous policy 
network for ambitious eco city projects. Strictly speaking, the national eco city programs are 
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not concerned with this type of eco city project and can, therefore, not be expected to 
anticipate to what extent other policy actors have divergent goals or how they deploy their 
resources in ways contrary to national ‘eco’ progress ambitions.  
Type 3: Nominal support from national government 
In type 3 projects, the actor network is similar to that of type 4 initiatives, but with the crucial 
difference that the national government (one of the ministries) becomes involved through the 
awarding of eco city demonstrator status. This increases a project’s relative attractiveness to 
developers as well as future occupants of the new urban space. The recognition status prompts 
more resources to go towards quality enhancement, because wealthier residents and cleaner 
high-tech companies are willing to pay a premium for green surroundings and lower pollution 
levels. Local governments have to put substantial efforts into promoting themselves as an eco 
city and being selected as a nationally recognized demonstrator city, but they seem content to 
do so: it adds to their status, and if the experiment succeeds it will even position them as ‘best 
practice’ exemplar which, in turn, can be used to spearhead sustainable urbanization 
elsewhere in the country (and beyond). Such awards are not only a vital instrument in 
promoting the city in question in the economic rat-race among cities, but they are also 
believed to be an essential asset for the senior political and administrative leaders when 
seeking promotion to higher positions. If previously it was solely GDP growth that mattered, 
in recent years the explicit ‘eco’ progress agenda has added some environmental indicators to 
the set of KPIs on which top officials in the CCP nomenclature are assessed. 
However, in spite of the growing influence of the ‘eco’ discourse in the promotion of real 
estate assets in type 3 projects (as compared to type 4 ones), the actor constellation and the 
interdependencies have not been fundamentally altered: the official recognition granted by the 
national ministries only influences the distribution of resources at the margins. 
Type 2: Limited support from national government paired with occasional foreign 
involvement  
M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
 
AC
CE
PT
ED
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
In type 2 projects, which are generally managed by wealthier cities with significant financial 
resources, the influence of professional expertise and prestige through leading international 
engineering and architecture firms becomes significant; these firms transfer knowledge from 
projects they have done elsewhere in the world. This results in a further strengthening of the 
effect of national recognition – namely, higher quality and higher prestige through leading 
expertise and advanced technology, as well as higher market value. Most of the proposed 
projects are developed to large scale and with the expectation of eventually accommodating 
residents into their hundreds of thousands. And the demands put on them have increased in 
recent years. In response to heavy traffic congestion, worrisome air quality and lack of 
greenery in a majority of urban environments, these initiatives strive for cleaner and greener 
urban areas where high-quality social amenities for education and healthcare are available. 
This is currently still the exception rather than the norm for new town developments in China; 
it requires concerted planning, serious quality control and extensive funding from local 
governments. The resource availability of cities involved in type 2 projects ensures that 
neighborhoods with good public facilities and embracing an environmental agenda can be 
created. The level of investment required is considerable, but the cities in question are willing 
to back these projects – as do new residents hoping for premium real estate value – based on 
the prospect of a markedly higher quality of urban life. As a result, the projects’ promoters 
can afford to be selective concerning the kinds of companies and residents (typically ones 
with higher levels of education and purchasing power) they wish to attract. 
Overall, the essential exchange relation in this network type remains focused on that between 
the city government and developers; however, other actors, in particular national ministries 
and foreign firms, play a fairly central role, too, and can be seen to influence policy 
implementation processes and outcomes. Nevertheless, while public facilities and urban space 
may be superior in comparison with conventional developments, advanced environmental 
sustainability as such may not be much of a priority. 
Type 1: Strong support from national government paired with structured foreign involvement  
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In comparison to type 2 projects, the network dynamics in type 1 projects shift decidedly 
towards top-down steering: national and foreign government agencies, through bilateral 
agreements, become directly involved in decision-making and act as powerful assurers of eco 
city projects. They exert direct political, legal and organizational influence through 
supervisory committees. Local governments must secure their approval as condition for 
implementing projects on the ground. The dealings between cities and developers are no 
longer a local matter, but are subject to close direction and scrutiny on the part of national 
government (and their foreign national counterparts). As such, central government itself 
becomes a quasi-local player deploying not only legal and political resources, but also 
organizational and financial ones. The relationship between local and central government then 
also becomes decidedly more symmetrical (than is the case in types 2-4) in terms of 
knowledge and information ownership and management. 
By entering into a formal relationship with a foreign government – typically ones with an 
acclaimed track record of sustainable urban development – and facilitating the involvement of 
related developers, constructors and consultants, the Chinese central government seeks to 
secure and warrant success. In doing so, the supported projects are rendered more prestigious, 
comprehensive and consequently more expensive than comparable projects of types 2-4. 
Systematic quality control becomes essential to the credibility of type 1 projects, resulting in 
detailed indicator frameworks, matched with systematic monitoring and reporting systems 
with the possibility of taking corrective action if deemed necessary. Yet, here again, 
economic priorities can be expected to trump environmental ones, since these eco city 
projects still essentially constitute real estate development and the main incentive for future 
residents is likely to be on superior public services and amenities (top-level schools and 
hospitals, along with attractive neighborhoods and ample green space) promoting urban 
well-being. Environmental innovation, thus, comes to depend heavily on the willingness of 
governmental actors to invest specifically in environmental sustainability measures.  
In summary, the core axis in policy networks for eco city development in China is that 
between local governments and developers exchanging land for revenues, which others have 
described as ‘local growth coalitions’ (Zhu, 1999) or ‘local growth machines’ (Wu, 2015). In 
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most cases, the term ‘eco city’ and related sister terms are used more for city branding 
purposes than fundamentally to promote an environmental agenda. This phenomenon takes 
place in an unfettered way in type 4 projects. In types 3 and 2, central government 
organizations attempt in varying degrees to influence the choices that local governments 
make, by providing incentives to make sustainability a serious consideration. However, this is 
mostly done in a top-down manner, which overemphasizes a rational planning mode and the 
technocratic application of analytical methods; conversely, it underemphasizes actor 
interdependencies. The relevance and necessary involvement of local governments to 
implementing national policies is recognized, but the conflicting nature of their goals and the 
importance of their resources are not. The role and legitimacy of private and commercial 
policy actors barely register on the radar of policy programs. This makes the emergence of a 
substantial implementation gap in eco city development an almost predictable outcome. The 
likelihood of type 1 projects avoiding such implementation difficulties is far higher, because 
here the relevance, legitimacy and involvement of public and private parties at various levels 
is taken as an essential ingredient for decision-making, investment and quality-control. 
However, realistically, how many local eco city projects around the country can the Chinese 
central government commit itself to in terms of active, hands-on involvement? 
6. Conclusions and implications 
The Chinese national eco city, low carbon city and low carbon eco city programs enacted by 
three different ministries in Beijing have set in motion a country-wide process whereby local 
governments volunteer to become officially endorsed demonstrator cities. Such recognition is 
bestowed on them in exchange for the responsibility to implement national policy locally, and 
the expectation to apply variously defined indicator frameworks as an essentially technocratic 
means of assessing and controlling how much social, economic and environmental progress is 
made with selected demonstrator projects. 
Unfortunately, most local governments fail to meet key sustainability standards, and many do 
not (or only inadequately) measure and monitor the performance of their demonstrator 
projects at all. What we have attempted to show in this article is that most policy frameworks 
undertaken by the national ministries do not sufficiently recognize the constellation of the 
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policy networks in which their eco city programs are implemented. Since local governments 
have different goals and their compliance is not something that can be assumed as automatic, 
central government tends to underestimate its dependence on collaboration with local 
governments and developers. While China’s tax sharing system obliges local governments to 
obtain revenues from leasing out land to developers and, therefore, require them to be 
primarily receptive to third-party funders, national ministries act as if local governments will 
voluntarily establish and apply eco city frameworks without financial compensation. Should 
they not do so, stricter enforcement practices will follow. Recently, national programs, such 
as those for eco civilization demonstration cities, sponge cities and smart cities, embrace the 
same top-down steering mechanism and are, therefore, likely to incur the same 
implementation problems as the ones analyzed in this article. These newer initiatives only add 
to the fragmentation of the eco progress policy the Chinese government has come to adopt 
over the last decade or two. 
A more effective way of encouraging local governments in China to engage actively in the 
implementation of ecological cities would be to change the calculus of their institutional 
incentives (Similar conclusions are drawn in a recent urban policy review for China by OECD, 
2015; see in particular Chapter 3 therein.). Since the need for land revenues defines much of 
their current eagerness to issue large volumes of land and embark on sizeable urbanization 
projects, unsustainable practices is de facto ingrained in China’s institutional structure for 
urban development. And since turning all eco city projects into type 1 developments is 
practically hardly realistic, minimizing local government dependency on land use revenues 
may be the only feasible way forward to achieving more effective policy implementation and 
high-quality outcomes for eco city development in China. This may in fact also be a 
necessary counter measure against the considerable oversupply of real estate in recent years. 
It is likely, then, that the (re-)configuration of multi-level and multi-lateral governance 
arrangements, and related questions of policy implementation, will surface and occupy the 
political agenda in China in years to come. 
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Ministry Program Key elements Pilot initiatives  
(status: 2015) 
MEP Eco cities, 
districts & 
counties 
• Indicators for establishing eco provinces, 
cities and villages (2003; revised 2007) 
• Evaluation program for establishing eco 
eco cities and eco counties (2005) 
• Guidelines for evaluating eco provinces, 
eco cities and eco counties (2006) 
• Promotion of ecological demonstration 
zones (2010) 
• 27 cities 
• 33 districts 
• 32 counties 
MOHURD Low carbon 
eco cities 
• Cooperation framework for low carbon eco 
cities, initially with 4 pilot areas (2010) 
• Dedicated ministerial unit for low carbon 
city development providing advice on 
planning/policy, indicator systems and 
technological applications (2011) 
• Support for piloting low carbon eco 
development for new cities and new 
districts within existing cities (2011) 
• 2 provinces 
• 2 cities 
• 6 cities under 
Sino-American 
initiative 
• 10 cities under 
Sino-European 
initiative 
 
NDRC Low carbon 
provinces & 
cities 
• Notice regarding pilot low carbon 
provinces and cities to (a) promote low 
carbon technologies and industries, (b) 
explore policy interventions and incentives; 
(c) set up GHG data collection and 
management system (2010) 
• Low carbon city standard, published by 
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences 
(2010) 
• 6 provinces 
• 36 cities 
 
Table 1: Eco city programs by MEP, MOHURD and NDRC. (See Appendix 1 for full list of 
participating provinces, cities, districts and counties. Sources: MEP, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2013a, 2015; 
MOHURD, 2011a, b; Mu, 2010; NDRC, 2010, 2012) 
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Highlights: 
 
1. Adds public policy as a new perspective to eco city development, in addition to political 
geography, urban planning and environmental engineering. 
2. Identifies factors why implementation of many eco city projects in China fails. 
3. Proposes policy network theory as a promising approach to understanding policy success 
and failure in eco city development. 
4. Develops a typology of eco cities in China. 
5. Establishes that local government’s dependency on land use revenues makes it less 
susceptible to policy incentives administered by central government ministries.
M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
 
AC
CE
PT
ED
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
Appendix 1: Three Chinese national eco city programs & related pilot initiatives. 
MEP 
Eco cities, 
districts & 
counties 
Cities (27): Annan; Changle; Changshu; Changzhou; Chongzhou; Fuqing; Jiangyin; 
Jintan; Kunshan; Linan; Liyang; Nanjing; Nantong; Ningguo; Rongcheng; Rushan; 
Suzhou; Taicang; Wendeng; Wujiang; Wuxi; Yiwu; Yixing; Zhalantun; 
Zhangjiagang; Zhongshan; Zhuhai 
Districts (33): Huzhou Wuxing District; Karamay District; Minhang District; 
Nanchang Wanli District; Nanjing Jiangning District; Nanjing Liuhe Districit; 
Nanjing Pukou District; Nanshan District; Nantong Tongzhou District; Qipanshan 
Development Area; Quanzhou Luojiang District; Shenbei New District; Shenyang 
Dongling District; Shenyang Sujiatun District; Shenzhen Futian District; Shenzhen 
Luohu District; Shenzhen Yantian District; Suzhou Wuzhong District; Taizhou 
Hailing District; Taizhou Jiangyan District; Wuxi Binhu District; Xiamen Haicang 
District; Xiamen Jimei District; Xiamen Tongan District; Xiamen Xiang’an District;  
Xi’an Chanba Ecological District; Xi’an Qujiang New District; Xiangcheng District; 
Xiqing District; Xishan District; Yuhong District; Zhuhai Doumen District; Zhuhai 
Jinwan District 
Counties (32):  Anhui Huoshan County; Anhui Yuexi County; Beijing Miyun 
County; Beijing Yanqing County; Fujian Anxi County; Fujian Dongshan County; 
Fujian Yongtai County; Henan Xinxiang County; Hunan Changsha County; Inner 
Mongolia Hulun Buir Erwenke County; Jiangsu Gaochun County;  Jiangsu Jinhu 
County; Jiangxi Fuliang County; Jiangxi Jingan County; Jiangxi Tonggu County; 
Jiangxi Ziyuan County; Jilin Tonghua County; Lioning Liaozhong County; Shanghai 
Chongming County; Shanxi Feng County; Sichuan Pi County; Sichuan Pujiang 
County; Sichuan Shuangliu County; Zhejiang Anji County; Zhejiang Kaihua 
County; Zhejiang Ninghai County; Zhejiang Panan County; Zhejiang Qingyuan 
County; Zhejiang Tonglu County; Zhejiang Xiangshan County; Zhejiang Xianju 
County; Zhejiang Xinchang County 
MOHURD 
Low carbon 
eco cities 
Provinces (2): Hebei; Guangdong 
Cities (17): Shenzhen; Wuxi 
-Sino-American cooperation (6): Hebi; Hefei; Jiyuan; Langfang; Rizhao; Weifang 
-Sino-European cooperation (10): Changzhou; Fenxi New District; Guilin; Hefei; 
Liuzhou; Luoyang; Qingdao; Weihai; Zhuhai; Zhuzhou 
NDRC 
Low carbon 
provinces & 
cities 
Provinces (6): Guangdong; Hainan; Hubei; Liaoning; Shaanxi; Yunnan 
Cities (36): Baoding; Beijing; Chizhou; Chongqing; Daxinganling; Gangzhou; 
Guangyuan; Guanzhou; Guilin; Guiyang; Hangzhou; Huaian; HulunBuir; Jinchang; 
Jincheng; Jingdezhen; Jinlin; Jiyuan; Kunming; Nanchang; Nanping;  
Ningbo; Qingdao; Qinhuangdao; Shanghai; Shenzhen; Shijiazhuang; Suzhou;  
Tianjin; Urumchi; Wenzhou; Wuhan; Xiamen; Yan’an; Zhenjiang; Zunyi 
MEP = Ministry of Environmental Protection; MOHURD = Ministry for Housing and Urban-Rural Development; NDRC = 
National Development and Reform Committee. (Sources: MEP, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2013a, 2015; MOHURD, 2011a, b; Mu, 
2010; NDRC, 2010, 2012) 
 
